Abstract
Under the influence of liberal-derived legal-economic thought, the study of the contract has long been conducted with exclusive reference to the repercussions it presents against the parties who entered into it. In the light of this individualistic approach, an objectively unfair and socially inefficient contract has no disvalue where the set-up of interests declined therein corresponds to the will of the parties. This explains the scant attention paid to the "social efficiency" profiles of the normative and jurisprudential regulation of the contract. The gradual overcoming of liberal ideology in its most extreme declination and the emergence of a Welfare State model have meant that scholars' attention has also (and especially) turned to the social efficiency profiles of contract regulation. It is clear that an efficient contract regulation system generates a significant impact on market efficiency. The purpose of the research at this point is to examine, through the lens of the scholar of the economic analysis of law, the typological variety of correctives through which the policy maker improves the ratio of contract outcomes to achieve the social optimum by means of contractual negotiation within the context of Italian law.
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I contenuti redazionali di questo sito sono distribuiti con una licenza Creative Commons, Attribuzione - Condividi allo stesso modo 3.0 Italia (CC BY-SA 3.0 IT) eccetto dove diversamente specificato. Diretta da G. Terracciano, G. Mazzei, J. Espartero Casado. Direttore Responsabile: G. Caputi. Redazione: C. Rizzo. Iscritta al N. 16/2009 del Reg. stampa del Tribunale di Roma - ISSN 2036-7821