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The corona juventocide political immunosenescence due to distorted census weight at the expense of young age cohorts.


According to current knowledge, the Corona VII measures of the years 2020/21 represent one of the largest and most monodimensional non-bellicose allocations of funds in human history; for the USA alone, they are in the range of the costs of the Second World War or the“War on Terror” 2001 sq. (We speak of Corona VII virus because it is the seventh coronavirus to become pathogenic for humans in a longer series of coronaviruses that had already become endemic before). What is striking about the IMF statistics on the Corona VII measures is which countries have provided by far the highest shares of GDP for equity, loans, and guarantees: It is Italy with 35.3%, Japan with 28.3% and Germany with 28.8%. These, in turn, are exactly the three countries that had the highest share of very old 80+ year olds in 2020. We suspect a correlation. Our thesis is that the fiscal and social juventocide––not murder, but manslaughter of youth with globally at least 150 million Years of Life Lost (YLL), and in any case uncountable billions of Years of Life Damaged (YLD)––was triggered by the age- or senescence-related risk aversion of Western democracies, existing for many decades already and called“uncertainty avoidance” by Geert Hofstede. For this, we propose to apply to the political body the term immunosenescence (familiarfrom ageing research and used in medicine to describe the decline of the body’s immune response beyond the age of 50), and to speak of political immunosenescence. We specify, that this is a highly special case of gerontocracy, because it gives the Young Elderly 60-79 years‘two votes’ instead of one. The mathematics of elections has changed insidiously since 1945 due to demographic shifts in the age cohorts of many nations. The census weight of the young has declined decisively. This has direct consequences for the future capabilities of countries, as their school policies before and during the pandemic show. We can speak of a Cultural Long-Covid. From the birth rates we can see that in the near future not only the Western democracies, but also the Russian Federation and the East Asian region, hereespecially the People’s Republic of China, will be faced with similar problems. As a result of our research, we discuss measures to strengthen the census of young age cohorts in elections, executive power and constitutions, as well as new strategies in education andarts’ policy.

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I contenuti redazionali di questo sito sono distribuiti con una licenza Creative Commons, Attribuzione - Condividi allo stesso modo 3.0 Italia (CC BY-SA 3.0 IT) eccetto dove diversamente specificato. Diretta da G. Terracciano, G. Mazzei, J. Espartero Casado. Direttore Responsabile: G. Caputi. Redazione: G. Iacovino, C. Rizzo. Iscritta al N. 16/2009 del Reg. stampa del Tribunale di Roma - ISSN 2036-7821